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The Constitutional Rights of Sexual
Minorities: A Crisis of the
Male/Female Dichotomy
By MARY C. DUNLAP*
In realms of human knowledge and experience that should inform
and interact with law, the presumption that two, and only two, distinct
and immutable sexes exist amounts to a questionable premise,' if not to
an ignorant prejudice. 2 While data and theories alike counsel against
an absolute two-sex presumption, the United States legal system ap-
pears to be fastened firmly upon the presumption that "[w]ith respect to
gender there are only two possible classifications."'3 This Article will
examine the implications of this two-sex presumption for the constitu-
tional claims of sexual minorities. The first section will describe the
source of the presumption in law and the effect of the presumption on
the academic, emotional, occupational, and social options available to
an individual. The second section will focus on the adverse effects this
presumption has on the privacy and due process rights of sexual minor-
ities.4 The Article will conclude that a vigorous and expansive reexam-
* B.A., 1968, J.D., 1971, University of California at Berkeley. Since 1974, Ms. Dun-
lap has been a staff attorney and teacher at Equal Rights Advocates, Inc., a public interest
law firm located in San Francisco, California.
1. S. LILAR, LE MALENTENDU DU DEUXIEME SEXE 281-85 (1969); M. MEAD, MALE
AND FEMALE passim (1949).
2. S. DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX passim (1978); B. FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE
MYSTIQUE passim (1963); Miller & Mothner, Psychological Consequences of Sexual
Inequality, 41 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 767 (1971).
3. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2755 (1978) (separate opin-
ion of Powell, J.). See notes 5-6 infra.
4. For purposes of this Article, the term sexual minorities encompasses generally
homosexuals, transsexuals (persons genetically of one sex who have a strong psychological
identification with and urge to belong to the other sex), and other persons of nontraditional
sexual identifications. Where specified, the term sexual minorities also may include women,
single parents, and others who are rendered sexual minorities by legal and societal
treatment.
Use of the term minority in this Article intentionally includes the connotation of "sub-
ject of majoritarian legal and/or political discrimination"; thus the term sexual minorities
may include such groups as unmarried mothers, see, e.g., Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate
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ination of the two-sex presumption is urgently needed, particularly by
those in the legal profession who presently take the presumption, with
all its implications, strictly for granted.
Legal Definitions of Sex: Past, Present and Possible
The law defines every person as either male or female by reference
to the genital anatomy of that person.5 From the moment of childbirth,
the two-sex presumption is enforced by law by designation of the new-
born's sex as male or female on the certificate of birth.6 Several states
provide, moreover, for the modification of the sex designation on birth
certificates following sex-conversion surgery.7 The apparent purposes
served by this official sex designation include demographic information
gathering and, presumably, the facilitation of governmental enforce-
ment of laws and programs that distinguish between males and fe-
males.8 Whatever interests the individual may hold in self-designation
of sex9 have been overridden by these governmental interests.
Both historically' 0 and currently, the state's categorization of the
School Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss. 1973), aff'd, 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
dismissed, 425 U.S. 559 (1976); juvenile females punished more severely than juvenile males
for the same acts, see Comment, Juvenile Delinquency Laws Juvenile Women and the Double
Standard of Morality, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 313 (1971); long-haired males, see, e.g., Kelley v.
Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976); and males with sideburns, see, e.g., Lindquist v. City of Coral
Gables, 323 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
5. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 10125(a), 10475-10479 (West Supp.
1978). See also Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982, 983, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500
(1971), in which the court held that the marriage ceremony did not create a valid marriage
contract because the defendant bride had "male sexual organs."
6. By statute in California the sex of the newborn must be designated on the birth
certificate. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 16125(a), 10475-10479 (West Supp. 1978). In
other jurisdictions, the state Department of Health or the Department of Vital Statistics is
given authority by statute to require that the sex of the newborn be included on the certifi-
cate of birth. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 3122 (Michie 1974); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 382.17(1) (West Supp. 1978); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4130(2) (McKinney 1977).
7. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 10475-10478 (West Supp. 1978). See
also Wein & Remmers, Employment Protection and Gender Dysphoria: Legal Definitions of
Unequal Treatment on the Basis of Sex and Disability, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1075, 506 nn. 25-29
(1979).
8. It is assumed, for example, that birth certificate data as to sex has been utilized to
enforce laws such as the male-only compulsory military service. It has also been used to
enforce state laws prohibiting marriage between members of the same sex. See, e.g., Baker
v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
9. See text accompanying notes 47-49 infra.
10. For historical accounts of legally enforced sex discrimination in the United States,
see L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1-99 (1969); K.
DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 1-35, 117-30, 814-16,
887-94 (1974).
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individual by sex carries explicit and implicit legal consequences. At
the present time, the designation of the person as male or female may
control that person's freedom as to schools and playmates. In
Vorcheimer v. School District of Philadelphia,"I for example, an equally
divided United States Supreme Court upheld the right of public school
boards to segregate students by sex into separate academic high
schools. Regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare, moreover, authorize even nonsegregating schools
receiving federal funds to separate "students by sex within physical ed-
ucation classes or activities during participation in boxing, wrestling,
rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball, and other sports the purpose of
[sic] major activity of which involves bodily contact."'
12
Categorization of the individual by sex may also limit the individ-
ual's freedom as to employment opportunities. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,13 although prohibiting discrimination in employ-
ment on account of sex, provides in part:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
hire and employ employees ... on the basis of... sex ... in those
certain instances where . . . sex . . . is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal occupation of that
particular business or enterprise .... 14
Relying on this language, the United States Supreme Court in Dothard
v. Rawlinson 15 upheld an Alabama administrative regulation prohibit-
ing women from serving as guards at the state's maximum security
male penitentiaries. The Court concluded that such a regulation fell
"within the narrow ambit of the bfoq [bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion] exception [to the Civil Rights Act of 1964]."16 In Long v. State
Personnel Board,17 the California Court of Appeal upheld the State
Personnel Board's action in denying a female Methodist minister the
position of Protestant chaplin at a state youth facility. The Board per-
mitted only males to occupy this position. The court held that the
male-only classification fell within the bona fide occupational qualifica-
11. 400 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), a ffd per
curiam, 430 U.S. 703 (1977); accord, Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970),
afid, 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
12. HEW Regulations, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs
and Activities Receiving or Benefitting From Federal Financial Assistance, 45 C.F.R.
§ 86.41 (1977). See generaly Comment, Title IX's Promise of Equalily of Opportunity in Ath-
letics: Does It Cover the Bases?, 64 Ky. L.J. 432 (1975); Annot., 23 A.L.R. Fed. 664 (1975).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
15. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
16. Id at 334.
17. 41 Cal. App. 3d 1000, 116 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1974).
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tion exception to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.18 The prohibition
against sex discrimination contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, moreover, has received varied degrees of enforcement and
judicial respect.' 9
The designation of the person as male or female may also restrict
that person's freedom as to personal physical appearance,20 as to living
arrangements,2' and as to intimate partners. In the United States, for
example, sexual activity between two males or two females commonly
is a subject of criminal prohibitions and penalties. 22 States generally
prohibit, moreover, persons "of the same sex" from legal marriage with
one another.23 The categorization of the individual at birth as male or
female, therefore, may have a profound impact on that person's devel-
opment. Sex categorization at birth may restrict in various ways the
individual's academic and occupational opportunities, limit the indi-
vidual's social and emotional development, and prescribe the individ-
ual's personal physical appearance, including clothing and hairstyle.
18. For a discussion of the "bona fide occupational qualification" exception to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see Sirota, Sex Discrimination.: Title VII and the Bona
Fide Occupational Qualflcation, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1025 (1977).
19. See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Law: Equal Protection Challenges to Gender-based
Classifications Evoke Varied Court Responses, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 182 (1977); 46 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 137 (1977). The Act, moreover, has been rendered inapplicable to the sex
discrimination claims of homosexuals, see notes 35 & 37 infra, and those who have under-
gone sex conversion surgery, see, e.g., Powell v. Read's, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369 (D. Md.
1977); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975), af'd,
570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978).
20. See text accompanying notes 39-44 infra.
21. "The real estate and home-financing industries traditionally have followed many
explicitly sex-discriminatory practices, including sex-stereotyped advertising, the refusal to
sell or rent to women, disparate terms and conditions of property transactions for women
and men, and the denial or discounting of credit to women customers." B. BROWN, A.
FREEDMAN, H. KATZ & A. PRICE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW 278 (1977). See also
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), wherein the Court held that the village
ordinance excluding more than two unrelated persons from one-family residences did not
violate the constitutional rights of excluded groups.
22. See, e.g., TEX. PENAt CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.06 (Vernon 1974). See also Rivera,
Our Straight-Laced Judges. The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States,
30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 949, Appendix A (1979) [hereinafter cited as Rivera]. The only major
federal constitutional challenge to this scheme failed. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for
Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), affid, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). But cf Jellum v.
Cupp, 475 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1973); Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971) (statutes held
unconstitutional). For the most recent cases challenging the constitutionality of state stat-
utes see Rivera, supra note 22, Appendix B.
23. Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
810 (1972); Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 1199 (1975); Rivera, supra note 22 at 1101. Note, Same Sex
Marriage and the Constitution, 6 U. CAL. D.L. REV. 275 (1973); Note, The Legality of Homo-
sexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973).
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A person may not resist or circumvent these sex-based restrictions
and limitations by refusing to be categorized sexually as either male or
female. Such a nonconforming person, whom we shall call X,24 almost
certainly will experience an array of legal coercions toward conformity
with the norms of the majoritarian, dominant culture as to fe-
male/male indicia of identity.
25
Our person X, for example, may be arrested and punished for
dressing or appearing in a manner that does not match X's genital
identity, or for using public toilet facilities without regard to the word
on the outside door.26 X may be prohibited from marriage,27 excluded
from a variety of public institutions and programs28 or subjected to in-
voluntary mental institutionalization.
29
Further examples of the legal enforcement of the features of the
male/female dichotomy abound. Courts may impose outright criminal
sanctions against so-called homosexual and other sexually noncon-
formist conduct.30 This coercion toward conformity, however, follows
even subtler methods. Courts have, for example, narrowly interpreted
prohibitions against sex-based discrimination contained in civil rights
statutes so as to remove the claims of sexual minorities from protection
under such statutes. This narrow interpretation of the civil rights stat-
utes has resulted in the vulnerability of nonconformists to losses of em-
ployment and other opportunities due to hair length, 31 dress style,3 2
24. The name X is borrowed from a recently-published book. L. GOULD, X: A
FABULOUS CHILD'S STORY (1978).
25. Because people generally do not walk around in public physically naked, the geni-
tal indicia of sexual identity have been supplemented societally by many nonanatomical
indicia of sex identification, from names and clothing, to speech habits, forms of emotional
expression, and types of personal activities and relationships. Note, for example, that the
right of a woman to keep and use her own name during marriage is by no means universally
respected. See, e.g., Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217, 222-23 (M.D. Ala. 1971), q'd
mem., 405 U.S. 970 (1972); Annot., 67 A.L.R.3d 1266 (1975).
26. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3980 (West 1974).
27. See Note, Same Sex Marriage and the Constitution, 6 U. CAL. D.L. REV. 275
(1973). In Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 312, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (1971), app. dismissed,
409 U.S. 810 (1972), the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that Minnesota law does "not
authorize marriage between persons of the same sex and. . . such marriages are. . . pro-
hibited." See note 21 supra.
28. See notes 11-20 supra.
29. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West Supp. 1978). A thoughtful re-
source on a related phenomenon is Roth & Lerner, Sex-Based Discrimination in the Mental
Institutionalization of Women, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 789 (1974).
30. See note 22 supra. See also I. DRUMMOND, THE SEX PARADOX 357-59 (1953).
31. In Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975), the
Fifth Circuit held that the defendant company's policy of denying employment to men (but
not women) with shoulder-length hair "is based not upon sex, but rather upon grooming
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"effeminate" manners by men,33 "masculine" manners by women, 34
improper choices of sexual partners,35 statements of personal belief in
freedom as to sexual identity, 36 sex reassignment surgery and transsex-
ualism, 37 and various other statements and conduct perceived to be
outside the bounds of the person's legally prescribed sexual identity.
38
The facts of a case recently decided by the Illinois Supreme Court,
City of Chicago v. Wilson,3 9 provide a classic illustration of the use of
law to enforce the male/female order and to punish departures from
that order.
standards, and thus outside the proscription of Sec. 703 [of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964]". 1d at 1088. As such, the employer had the right to refuse to employ any male
who did not conform to the employer's "grooming" standards. In Fagan v. National Cash
Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the District of Columbia Circuit likewise re-
fused to hold that an employer's rule forbidding male employees from wearing long hair
constituted discrimination based on sex. The court interpreted the rule as governing only a
matter of grooming. Id at 1125; see Annot., 27 A.L.R. Fed. 274 (1976). Butsee Donohue v.
Shoe Corp. of America, 337 F. Supp. 1357 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Aros v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
32. See Annot., 27 A.L.R. Fed. 274, 291-93 (1976). See generally Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d
353 (1976) (power of courts to impose standards of dress).
33. Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ga. 1975), a f'd, 569 F.2d
325 (5th Cir. 1978). In Smith, the court held that the employer's election not to employ a
"male" applicant because of his "effeminate" appearance did not constitute discrimination
based on sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
34. Id; ef Fogg v. New England Bell Tel. Co., 346 F. Supp. 645 (D.N.H. 1972) (plain-
tiffs "aggressive," "ambitious" manner not calculated to gain her supervisor's approbation).
35. See note 13 supra. See also EEOC Decision No. 76-75, 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE
(CCH) 6495 (1976); EEOC Decision No. 76-67 (1975) (unpublished). Oldham, Questions of
Exclusion and Exception Under Title VII-"Sex-Plus"and the BFOQ, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 55,
.67-71 (1971).
36. See Wilson & Shannon, Homosexual Organizations and the Right ofAssociation, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 1029, (1979).
37. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977). In Holloway,
the court held that an "employee may be discharged, consistent with Title VII, for initiating
the process of sex transformation." Id at 661. See note 13 supra. See also Powell v. Read's,
Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369 (D. Md. 1977). Weim & Remmers, supra note 7, at 520-26.
38. See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976). In
Miller, the district court held that an employer is not liable under the Civil Rights Act of
1964 for a male supervisor's sexual advances to a female employee. Such actions, the court
reasoned, did not constitute sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Act. But see
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390
F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975). Ironically, adverse employment consequences for sexual
behavior within roles have also been reinforced by such narrowing interpretations of Title
VII. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), wherein the Court held that
pregnancy-based discrimination is not per se discrimination against women on the basis of
sex. See generally Annot., 27 A.L.R. Fed. 537 (1976).
39. No. 49229 (Ill. May 1978); see Note, City of Chicago v. Wilson and Constitutional
Protection/or PersonalAppearance." Cross Dressing as an Element ofSexual Identiy, 30 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1151 (1979).
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Defendants were arrested on February 18, 1974, minutes after they
emerged from a restaurant where they had had breakfast. Defendant
Wilson was wearing a black, knee-length dress, a fur coat, nylon
stockings and a black wig. Defendant Kimberley had a bouffant hair
style and was wearing a pants suit, high-heeled shoes and cosmetic
makeup. Defendants were taken to the police station and were re-
quired to pose for pictures in various stages of undress. Both defend-
ants were wearing brassieres and garter belts; both had male
genitals.4
0
The City of Chicago asserted four reasons for the municipal ordi-
nance banning "cross-dressing" in public: "(1) to protect citizens from
being misled or defrauded; (2) to aid in the description and detection of
criminals; (3) to prevent crimes in washrooms; and (4) to prevent inher-
ently antisocial conduct which is contrary to the accepted norms of our
society."
4'
In determining that the municipal ordinance under which defend-
ants were convicted 42 unconstitutionally infringed upon the defendants'
liberty interests in appearance, the majority of the Illinois Supreme
Court emphasized that defendants' "cross-dressing" was a part of ther-
apy in their preparation for sex-reassignment surgery.43 The court,
however, did not hold the ordinance facially unconstitutional. Rather,
the court found that because the city offered no evidence to substantiate
its reasons "for infringing on the defendants' choice of dress under the
circumstances of this case,"44 the ordinance was unconstitutional as ap-
plied to the defendants at bar.
45
It may safely be assumed, therefore, that had defendants not been
the subjects of therapy prerequisite to sex-reassignment surgery, the
court would not have held that the defendants' liberty interests in ap-
pearance outweighed the state's interest in banning "cross-dressing" in
public. Thus, if defendants had attired themselves in "female" clothing
because they were motivated by curiosity, or whimsy, or simply a per-
sonal taste for such clothing, the court's determination as to the appli-
cation of the ordinance to defendants apparently would have differed.
Because the defendants were seeking to become anatomical females,
40. City of Chicago v. Wilson, No. 49229, slip op. at 1 (Ili. May 1978).
41. Id at 4.
42. Id. at 1.
43. Id at 4-5.
44. Id at 5.
45. City of Chicago .Wilson may, therefore, be interpreted as challenging the two-sex
presumption that generally operates in and is reinforced by our legal system, insofar as the
court held that the defendants' individual rights of choice as to personal appearance out-
weighed the government's declared interests in crime detection and prevention and in en-
forcement of majoritarian societal morality, to wit, enforcement of the male/female order.
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and thereby to remain within the bounds of the two-sex presumption, the
court found their interests to be constitutionally protected.
City of Chicago v. Wilson clearly illustrates, therefore, that the law
will contribute to significant forces in coercing individuals to conform
with the norms of the dominant culture as to male/female indicia of
identity. Quite a different result would occur, however, if the two-sex
presumption in law were replaced by a principle that one's sex could be
determined by that person, that the choice of sex were not limited to
male or female, and that the person could make different determina-
tions as to sex identification for various purposes, such as education,
marriage, living arrangements, or personal physical appearance. In
such a legal system, the individual would be free, at least in theory, not
only to determine, maintain, change, and control personal sexual iden-
tity, but also to avoid suffering the limitations and sanctions that our
person X consciously suffers, and that others who conform to conven-
tional sex designations also suffer, consciously or not, by the present
coercive enforcement of the two-sex presumption through law.
The considerable potential for change embodied in the principle
that the individual should be the ultimate arbiter of that individual's
own sex identification(s) has not yet been advocated in any wide sense
by those challenging sex-discriminatory laws. 46 Indeed, where oppo-
nents of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment have argued that the
amendment threatens perforce to create a monotonous "unisex" phe-
nomenon 4 7 the ERA proponents certainly have not responded that the
amendment would foster the emergence of a virtually limitless number
and variety of sex identifications other than male and female. 48 Quite
46. Legal challenges to sex-based restrictions have not questioned the presumption that
only two sexes exist. Instead, these challenges, while attacking the specific legal differentia-
tions at issue in each case, have assumed and relied upon the correctness and accuracy of the
two-sex presumption itself. No plaintiff has yet asserted that the law's two-sex presumption
unlawfully discriminates.
47. See note 93 infra. See also Schlafly, ERA.. Loss of Protection, TRIAL, Nov./Dec.
1973, at 18.
48. Both inside and outside of the ERA ratification drive, the women's rights move-
ment has been perceived as a threat to the male/female ordering of society. For some, the
symbolic threat of the women's rights movement is greatest in terms of underclothing and
toilet facilities. See sources cited notes 5 & 25 supra; Count Marco, That Idiotic Equal Rights
Amendment, San Francisco Chronicle, Aug. 17, 1970, at 19, col. 7. For others, the women's
movement threatens traditional family structure. M. DECTER, THE NEW CHASTITY AND
OTHER ARGUMENTS AGAINST WOMEN'S LIBERATION (1972); Kurland, The Equal Rights
Amendment: Some Problems of Construction, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 243, 247-48 (1971).
For still others, the notion of a woman being the "boss" or driving a truck or putting out a
fire represents the most substantial fear of women's equality. V. PACKARD, THE SEXUAL
WILDERNESS 118 (1968); Golden, Acute Attack of Impotence, HUMAN SEXUALITY, July
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predictably, proponents of ERA have answered the argument about the
threat of "unisex" by reasserting that the male/female organization and
dichotomization of life beyond law is in no sense menaced by the prin-
ciple of legal equality without regard to sex.
49
In cases aimed at sex-discriminatory laws, as well as in the ERA
ratification effort, therefore, political and legal advocates have not yet
addressed the idea that the authority of government to prescribe and
enforce male and female identities ultimately, and in X's case immedi-
ately, conflicts with the principle of individual freedom from sex-based
discrimination through law. The continuing refusal of traditionalists
and egalitarians alike to address this crucial issue, and to examine the
agreed-upon current legal definition of sex from the vantage point of
X's plight, leaves the question unanswered: Can a government provide
equality of treatment to all persons without regard to sex when the very
first relationship between legal authority and the individual consists of
the legal authority's categorization of the individual as male or
female?50
Legal Recognition of the Constitutional Rights of Sexual
Minorities
The Right To Be Let Alone: Is Legal Privacy Available To Sexual
Minorities?
In 1928, Justice Louis Brandeis, in defining the right of the indi-
vidual to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions, observed
that:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the signifi-
cance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of
life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Ameri-
1972, at 66. Advocates of equality fail to realize that these types of fears are deeply embed-
ded in the conditioning of persons into roles according to their designation as males or
females and overlook the essential conflict between the two-sex presumption and the princi-
ple of freedom from sex-based discrimination under law. Indeed, those who seek to end
discrimination against women in particular will not avoid opposition and defeats from those
who seek to attack the women's rights movement by insisting that there is no basic disagree-
ment or disharmony between the equality principle as applied within a legal system that is
premised upon a female/male dichotomy and the equality principle as applied within a legal
system that bestows the authority to determine sexual identity upon each individual.
49. Bayh, The Equal Rights Amendment, 6 IND. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1972); Controversy
over the 'Equal Rights/or Women'Amendment, CONG. DIG., Jan. 1971, at 1-32; J. Budde,
ERA to Aid Housewives, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 17, 1974, § 2, at 4, col. 4.
50. See text accompanying notes 5-9 supra.
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cans in their beliefs, in their thoughts, their emotions and their sensa-
tions. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men.
5'
This right of privacy-freedom from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion-will become meaningful in the lives of sexual minorities, how-
ever, only when courts agree that a person's sexual minority status in
and of itself does not warrant governmental intrusion.
For example, in the case of City of Chicago v. Wilson, 52 discussed
above, the defendants "were taken to the police station and were re-
quired to pose for pictures in various stages of undress. '5 3 An officially
enforced physical stripping of the individual is unquestionably a severe
invasion of the "right to be let alone" by government. The justification
for such an invasion of privacy, therefore, should have been substan-
tial. Yet in this case, the city offered no such justification. Defendants
had done nothing more than attire themselves in "female" clothing, and
appear, so attired, in public. The declared official grounds on which
the city based the power of the police to arrest, strip and photograph
the defendants-identification of criminals, prevention of fraud and
crimes in washrooms, and prohibition of antisocial conduct54-bore no
relationship to the actual conduct of the defendants.
55
Courts have long assumed that certain governmental interests such
as those recited in City of Chicago v. Wilson are substantially served by
governmental intrusions upon the privacy of sexual minorities. Be-
cause of this assumption, many such persons may not enjoy the peace
of mind that Justice Brandeis viewed as integral to the well-being of
"civilized men."'56 The power of government to probe and to question
the individual's sex identification, particularly in the context of law en-
forcement,57 therefore, has not undergone the critical stage of judicial
balancing against the individual's constitutional right to be let alone by
government.
51. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (emphasis added). For an
account of the origins of the right to privacy, see Richards, SexualAutonomy and the Consti-
tutional Right to Privacy A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 957, 972-75, (1979).
5,. No. 49229 (Ill. May 1978). See text accompanying notes 39-45 supra.
53. City of Chicago v. Wilson, No. 49229, slip op. at 1 (I11. May 1978).
54. Id at 4.
55. Defendants were arrested as "they emerged from a restaurant where they had had
breakfast." Id at 1.
56. See general Note, Extending the Right to Sexual Privacy, 2 W. ST. L. REv. 281
(1975); Note, Sexual Freedom for Consenting Adults-Why not?, 2 PAC. L.J. 206 (1971).
57. See cases cited note 17 supra. See also McKeand v. Laird, 490 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir.
1973).
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The more comprehensive the government's authority to enforce
the law's two-sex presumption, and to punish departures from it, via
probes into the mental and physical makeup of the individual, the
more worthless is the individual's right to privacy. Moreover, the gov-
ernment's apparently unfettered power to inquire, probe, and interro-
gate in cases involving sexual minorities invites abuses of that authority
to satisfy the imagination, fantasy or curiosity of the probing officials.
58
By and large, this authority to probe in cases concerning sexual minori-
ties has been left unquestioned by the courts, even in cases where the
probing has led to violations of other substantive constitutional
rights.59 Indeed, if sexual minorities are to share in having their rea-
sonable expectations of privacy respected by government, courts must
go beyond assumptions about the criminality60 and immorality6l of
sexual minorities and develop workable limitations upon the govern-
ment's power to probe that will uphold those persons' reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy.
A further constitutional consideration underscores the need for ju-
dicial limitations upon governmental invasions of the privacy of sexual
minorities: Where the law fails to protect reasonable expectations of
privacy on the part of sexual minorities, the exercise of other constitu-
tional rights by such persons becomes a matter of willingness to forego
privacy. If the sexual minority person, or even a person of conven-
tional sex identity who seeks to advance the rights of sexual minorities,
may be subjected to governmental inquisition solely on the basis of
speech, assembly, or association, none who cherish freedom from such
governmental intrusion will be free to exercise those first amendment
rights. 62
58. See note 53 & accompanying text supra.
59. See cases cited notes 21 & 57 supra. See also Anonymous v. Kissinger, 499 F.2d
1097 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1974); Scott v. Macy (II), 402 F.2d 644 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); Marks v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 1373 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Richardson v. Hamp-
ton, 345 F. Supp. 600 (D.D.C. 1972).
60. See, e.g., Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073, 1075 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond,
403 F. Supp. 1199, 1200-02 (E.D. Va.), af'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). See generally Note, The
Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1613
(1974); Note, Homosexuality and the Law-A Right to be Different, 38 ALB. L. REv. 84
(1974).
61. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 311-12, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (1971);
Note, The Lesbian Mother: Her Right to Child Custody, 4 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 1 (1973).
62. Several courts appear to have cited the fact of otherwise protected first amendment
exercises as a basis for depriving the sexual nonconformist of privacy. See, e.g., Singer v.
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 429
U.S. 1034 (1977) (plaintiff's employment with Civil Service Commission terminated because
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A long established principle of constitutional interpretation recog-
nizes that any governmental action that forces a person to forego one
set of constitutional rights for the exercise of another is impermissi-
ble.63 Nevertheless, where the privacy interests of sexual minorities are
concerned, some courts have imposed precisely such impermissible
choices, 64 resulting in a grievous and unnecessary fragmentation of the
Constitution as a whole when the rights of sexual minorities are con-
cerned. Examples of this fragmentation abound in cases concerning
sexual minorities in civilian and military public employment. 65 Public
employees who openly express their unorthodox sex identifications by
speech, associations, and assembly may find that neither their reason-
able expectations of privacy nor their right to be free of arbitrary treat-
ment by public employers will be protected. Those who succeed in
avoiding any suggestion of personal sexual nonconformity may never-
theless have their privacy invaded; those who are not secretive about
their unconventional sex identifications run a substantial and constitu-
tionally incompatible risk that their privacy interest will be swept
aside.
66
Collision Of A Probing Government With The Due Process Rights Of
Sexual Minorities: What Has Survived?
Whether and to what extent the rights to privacy and due process
of a sexual minority person will be respected in the law varies consider-
ably not only from institution to institution but from tribunal to tribu-
nal and from time to time. That is, it cannot be safely and soundly
of his open comments to the press regarding his "homosexuality"); Burton v. Cascade
School District, 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975) (plaintiff dismissed
from teaching position for proclaiming herself to be a "homosexual"); cf. Ferm v. Thorp
Public School, 532 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir. 1976) (teacher, faced with discharge because of distri-
bution to students of materials on homosexuality, waived claim of deprivation of constitu-
tional right by seeking injunctive relief). Courts have also overridden clearly protectible first
amendment rights where they have been exercised by sexual minorities. See, e.g., Singer v.
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 429
U.S. 1034 (1977); McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1046 (1971); see Wilson & Shannon, Homosexual Organizations and the Right of Association,
30 HASTINGS L.J. 1029 (1979); cf Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974)
(teacher's deliberate withholding of information relating to homosexuality precluded suit
seeking return of teaching position). But see Aumiller v. University of Delaware, 434 F.
Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977).
63. See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147, 151 (1959)).
64. See cases cited note 62 supra.
65. See cases cited note 62 supra & notes 67-69 infra.
66. See cases cited notes 67-69 infra.
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predicted from case precedents whether there will be judicial consider-
ation of these rights when a sexual minority person is concerned.
The variation in the respect given to these individual rights from
institution to institution is consistent with the variation in levels ofjudi-
cial deference to particular governmental institutions and functions.
Where there is a history of judicial deference to the power of the gov-
ernmental entity or branch-such as in cases involving the military,
67
police forces,68 or immigration authorities 69-- courts tend to rule in
favor of the institution and against the privacy and due process claims
of the sexual minority subject to the actions of such institutions. Ex-
ceptions to this pattern of judicial "hands off" are quite rare.
70
On the other hand, the pattern of judicial decisionmaking is far
more uneven in cases concerning sexual minorities and institutions his-
torically subject to relatively greater judicial review. Cases concerning
sexual minorities in federal civil service employment are illustrative. In
1969, the rule developed that, in those cases where the civil service em-
ployee was dismissed on the basis of alleged homosexual conduct, due
process required the showing of a nexus between the employee's con-
duct and the employee's fitness in the job.71 Yet, several cases brought
since the promulgation of this standard for due process to sexual mi-
norities have generated serious questions as to the enforceability of
the nexus standard.72 In Singer v. United States Civil Service
Commission,73 for example, the plaintiff was dismissed for "immoral
and notoriously disgraceful conduct,"74 consisting of an active and
public involvement in the gay rights movement7 5 and open, public dis-
67. Berg v. Clayton, 436 F. Supp. 76 (D.D.C. 1977). But see Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F.
Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (appeal pending).
68. Judicial deference to imposition of restrictive regulations as to personal style upon
police is exemplified in Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
69. See, e.g., Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118 (1967);
Lavoie v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 418 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 854 (1970). But see In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
70. See cases cited notes 67-69 supra.
71. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see Scott v. Macy (II), 402 F.2d
644 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The rule was embodied in the Civil Service's own regulations in 1975.
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n Suitability Guidelines for Federal Employment, 5 C.F.R.
§ 731.202(b)-(c) (1978). See also Rivera, supra note 22, at 915-28.
72. See, e.g., Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976),
vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977). See also Gueory v. Hampton, 510 F.2d 1222
(D.C. Cir. 1974). See notes 73-78 & accompanying text infra.
73. 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977).
74. Id at 249-50.
75. Id.
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play of affection toward a member of the same sex. 76 Although the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court, the judicial and ad-
ministrative treatment of Singer's case leaves considerable doubt as to
the effectiveness of the "nexus" test as a means of guaranteeing due
process to sexual minorities.
Moreover, in Singer, as in other cases raising the right of sexual
minorities to due process, the United States Supreme Court did not
exercise its responsibility to assure that the individual's constitutional
rights have been safeguarded. 77 Whatever the ultimate outcome of
such cases in the United States Supreme Court, the present absence of
Supreme Court review on the merits of sexual minorities' claims under
the United States Constitution perpetuates the likelihood of continued
conflicting decisionmaking regarding those claims among the lower
federal and state courts.
78
Along with institutional and jurisdictional variabilities in the treat-
ment of due process claims by sexual minorities, due process interpre-
tations have waxed and waned over chronological and political time.
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court with respect to
procedural due process, 79 for example, have imposed substantial limi-
tations upon the availability of a due process approach to challenge
adverse governmental actions, especially in employment cases. The ap-
plication of a substantive due process approach, particularly in cases
where sexual minorities have been conclusively presumed to be unfit
for any given relationship to government, 80 will be affected by the
Supreme Court's imposition of restrictions upon the substantive due
process approach.
8'
In summary, federal courts have not developed the concept of per-
sonal privacy as a source of safeguards against governmental probing
of sexual minorities. Resources vary for such judicial development in
76. Id
77. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va.
1975), afi'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976); Gish v. Board of Educ., 145 N.J. Super. 96, 366 A.2d 1337,
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286,
559 P.2d 1340 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
78. See cases cited note 77 supra. Compare Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88
Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977) with Morrison v. State
Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
79. See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977) (per curiam); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S.
238 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 157 (1974).
80. See Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (appeal pending).
81. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); Mourning v. Family Publica-
tions Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
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state legal systems. Further, the consequences of such unlimited gov-
ernmental probing-which may include stigmatization 82 and losses of
liberty83 and property 4-frequently have gone unaccompanied by due
process to the individual. Finally, even where due process standards
have been developed and applied to the cases involving sexual minori-
ties, those applications vary markedly with diverse historical, political,
and social factors affecting judicial decisionmaking about sexual
minorities.
Equal Protection: Does It Encompass Discrimination Against Sexual
Minorities?
The development of the equal protection guarantee embodied in
the fifth and fourteenth amendments must be viewed as a process. Ref-
erence to various equal protection formulae and precedents is insuffi-
cient to create an understanding of the scope and limitations of equal
protection with respect to any particular person, group, or situation.
Thus, it is not particularly meaningful in the analysis of equal protec-
tion as applied to sexual minorities to recite that, regarding lines drawn
on the basis of nonsuspect categories, such lines must at least be ration-
ally related to the legitimate governmental objectives that such lines are
drawn to achieve. Assuming arguendo that "minimal rationality" is the
test of equal protection that is likeliest to be applied to the claims of
sexual minorities,8 5 what is deemed "reasonable" in one court, one po-
litical climate, or one economic period may be determined to be utterly
82. See, e.g., Burton v. Cascade School Dist., 512 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1975). See cases
cited note 67 supra.
83. Arguably, every loss of privacy results in a loss of liberty-the precious liberty to be
free of unwarranted governmental intrusions. See note 51 & accompanying text supra.
84. The property, and reasonable expectations of property, Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), that sexual minorities have
lost through government probing include jobs, both military and nonmilitary. See cases
cited notes 62-68, 77 supra.
85. The category of minority sexual identification, orientation, preference, or expres-
sion certainly has not been held "suspect." But the argument for "suspectness" has been
made in several forums. See Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (Md. 1973),
aft'd, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); Note, Is Gay Suspect?, 8
LINC6LN L. REV. 24 (1973). In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the United States
Supreme Court utilized an intermediate standard of review to judge laws that classify or
discriminate on the basis of sex: "[C]lassifications by gender must serve important govern-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."
Id at 197. However, in light of the many past decisions in which courts have excluded the
claims of sexual minorities from protection under various civil rights statutes prohibiting
sex-based discrimination, see notes 31-38 supra, it seems unlikely at this time that laws or
regulations discriminating against sexual minorities will be subjected to this intermediate
standard of review.
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unreasonable in others.86 A complete determination of the present and
immediate future of equal protection as to sexual minorities would re-
quire analysis of all of those variables; such analysis is beyond the am-
bitions and purposes of this Article.
Within the bounds of this Article, however, certain observations
about the factors generally affecting the equal protection process do
warrant mention. The chief current barriers to the development of
equal protection as applied to the claims of sexual minorities appear to
be: (1) the widespread if sometimes tacit assumption, by the makers
and interpreters of laws, that all sexual minorities are immoral, 87 dan-
gerous, 88 or criminal89per se; (2) the consequent unlikelihood that legal
barriers to sexual minority persons' exercises of basic personal free-
doms in marriage, education, employment, sexuality, family life, and
public service will be found to be irrational and/or insufficiently re-
lated to legitimate governmental interests; (3) the continuing anomalies
of equal protection theory as applied to the related 90 matter of sex dis-
crimination against females and males.91 Given these formidable polit-
86. A most compelling account of equal protection as a multi-institutional process, ren-
dered in the context of an historical account of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), may be found in R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975).
87. See cases cited note 21 supra. For a critical evaluation of this assumption see Rich-
ards, supra note 51, at 731-42.
88. See, e.g., Gay Lib v. University of Missouri, 416 F. Supp. 1350, 1368-70 (W.D. Mo.
1976), rev'd, 558 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1977). See also dissent of Regan, D.J.: "[T]he University
was entitled to protect itself and other students on campus, in this small way, against abnor-
mality, illness and compulsive conduct of the kind here described in the evidence." 558 F.2d
at 859.
89. See cases cited note 21 supra.
90. See text accompanying notes 47-50 supra. The conferees at the 1977 International
Women's Year Conference in Houston, Texas, tacitly recognized the link between discrimi-
nation against women and discrimination against other sexual minorities by adopting the
the following resolution:
"Congress, State and local legislatures should enact legislation to eliminate discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual and affectional preference in areas including, but not limited to,
employment, housing, public accommodations, credit, public facilities, government funding
and the military.
"State Legislatures should reform their penal codes or repeal State laws that restrict
private sexual behavior between consenting adults.
"State legislatures should enact legislation that would prohibit consideration of sexual
or affectional orientation as a factor in any judicial determination of child custody or visita-
tion rights. Rather, child custody cases should be evaluated solely on the merits of which
party is the better parent, without regard to that person's sexual and affectional orientation."
NAT'L COMM'N ON THE OBSERVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S YEAR, THE SPIRIT OF
HOUSTON 89 (March 1978). See note 85 supra.
91. "The perception of racial classifications as inherently odious stems from a lengthy
and tragic history that gender-based classifications do not share. . . .[T]he Court has never
viewed [gender-based] classification as inherently suspect or as comparable to racial or eth-
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ical, psychological, and philosophical barriers to the realization that
many sexual minorities are victims of a labyrinth of de jure discrimina-
tions, it is not surprising that a search today for equal protection prece-
dents in favor of that realization unearths no such decisions.92
The Case for a Redefinition of Individual Rights: Exploring the
Constitutional Galaxy
The present legal system, by its enforcement of an absolute dichot-
omy between male and female, imposes significant burdens upon the
individual. From the subtle and oft-unnoticed pressures of laws that
segregate male and female, to the overt punishment of the person re-
sisting such segregation, the cost of legal enforcement of the
male/female presumption is paid by every individual. Some pay most
dearly. Sexual minorities, for example, have lost essential constitu-
tional freedoms, including privacy, first amendment exercises and four-
teenth amendment protections of liberty and property, as a direct
consequence of the refusal of the legal system to permit individualized
sex identifications that vary in any degree from the genitally based
male/female dichotomy. The fundamental and drastic nature of these
constitutional deprivations argues most compellingly for a system in
which each person is free to define that person's own sex identity for
legal purposes.
An essential commonality exists among the distinct
groups-women, homosexuals, mothers of illegitimate children, sexu-
ally reassigned persons, and others-who have suffered from the power
of the law to prescribe sex identity, and, correlatively, to enforce sex
roles in all areas of life. That essential commonality consists of govern-
ment discrimination in the distribution and protection of legal rights
extending from the basic constitutional right of privacy to statutory
civil rights in realms such as education, employment, and public ac-
commodations. As long as government retains the power to prescribe
sex identity through law, government retains the ability to discriminate
on account of sex regardless of the particular focus of discrimination in
any given era.
If the individual's authority to define sex identity were to replace
the authority of law to impose sex identity, many of the most difficult
problems currently associated with the power of government to probe,
nic classifications for the purpose of equal-protection analysis." Board of Regents of Univ.
of California v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2755 (1978) (separate opinion of Powell, J.).
92. See notes 59, 62, 67, 69 & 72 supra.
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penalize, and restrict basic freedoms of sexual minorities would be re-
solved individualistically and functionally, without ready reference to
the mythologies of sin and sickness that presently preclude fundamen-
tal fairness in the treatment of sexual minorities by government. The
power of government to force persons of a particular genital makeup to
perform military services, 93 or to bear unwanted offspring,94 or to par-
ticipate for any given purpose, such as school attendance or athletic
endeavors, only with persons of the same sex, 95 would be rendered
ineffective. Indeed, under a system that permits individualized sex
identification, the past exercises of the legal power to enforce a
male/female order might be discovered to have played a primary role
in retarding the progress of creativity and diversity among human be-
ings in their relationships to each other, to institutions and to the envi-
ronment.96 While such discoveries now seem far distant from the
horizons of the United States Constitution, perhaps tomorrow's jour-
neys into extraterrestrial space,97 or earth creatures' own ventures into
the technology of cloning and test-tube productions of new life forms,98
93. See 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1976); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
94. Poelker v. Doe, 428 U.S. 909 (1977). The most recent variation on the congres-
sional theme of abortion funds cutoffs was articulated by Rep. Robert K. Dornan (R.-Cal.),
the sponsor of a bill that passed the House on August 10, 1978, which would prohibit use of
defense budget monies to pay for abortions among active or retired servicewomen, and de-
pendents and survivors of servicemembers. He orated: "There are some of us who believe
we place a curse upon the Army of this free country if we allow 26,000 military wives and
dependents to have children killed in their wombs." Los Angeles Times, Aug. I1, 1978, pt.
II, at 6.
95. See notes 11-12 supra.
96. Some contemporary writers have prophesied the doom of civilization by means of
the movement of women toward equal rights. See, e.g., A. DE RIENCOURT, SEX AND POWER
IN HISTORY x (1974): "The contemporary woman's liberation drive toward a decrease in
sexual differentiation, to the extent that it is leading toward androgyny and unisexual values,
implies a social and cultural death-wish and the end of the civilization that endorses it. The
scientific and historical record shows that all the way from unicellular organisms to human
beings, progress in evolution has been stimulated by the increase in sexual differentiation."
See notes 25-30 supra. By that selfsame "logic" of the "unisex" argument, the emergence
and recognition of sexual differentiations within the so-called "female" population and
within the so-called "male" population could lead to survival, progress and the increased
enrichment of life.
97. From the standpoints of both science and art, the probability that extraterrestrial
life forms are genitally distinct "male" and "female" seems about as likely as that those
forms will speak Earth languages and eat Earth foods.
98. Fancy the cloning of a person possessing the ability to procreate without a partner.
To those who see a threat to reproduction in so-called "androgny," such an actual ability
might seem impressive and reassuring indeed, given that the person's capacity to procreate
would depend on no one else.
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or even today's silent mutations,99 will rapidly and vividly bring the
nascent potentials of individual sex definition, free of the present para-
digm of two sexes, into focus in the constitutional galaxy.
99. Glass, The Genetic Basis ofHuman Races, in SCIENCE AND THE CONCEPT OF RACE
91 (1968).

